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Abstract
This thesis studies a revenue management problem faced by providers of dierentiated and
congested services when customer preferences are subject to externalities. In particular, a
customer benets not only from receiving the oered service, but also from participating in
the service with other customers. The provider oers multiple services dierentiated by a
measurable attribute and customers have idiosyncratic preferences for this attribute. The
preference to conform around a particular oered service can nonetheless, cause congestion
as customers systematically avoid less popular options. Such congestion increases the
marginal cost of serving a customer. For this setting, we address the following questions:
When can product dierentiation reduce the congestion in the system? If the service
provider can dierentiate customers, what is the optimal level of dierentiation? When is
the optimal level of dierentiation a Nash equilibrium and when is that Nash equilibrium
stable (i.e. not disrupted by a deviation by a small number of customers)? We consider
rst a simple model where idiosyncratic customer preferences are uniformly distributed
on a determined interval and the provider places up to two dierentiated services. We
then consider more general settings including allowing arbitrary customer distributions,
increasing the number of possible dierentiated services and associating provider revenue
with the dierentiation attribute. The model was initially motivated by a problem in the
gaming industry but extends to many other types of service providers where customers
have similar attributes such as online video games and other entertainment settings.
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This introductory chapter provides outlines the primary components of the problem, a
brief overview of the concepts we employed in this study, and nally oers a breakdown
and guideline for how this thesis should be read.
1.1 Initial Problem
For certain types of services, customers receive greater utility when they participate in
the service in larger groups. This eect can caused by dierent reasons. For example, in
night clubs customers prefer the crowded club, because they have more "fun", or among
some similar restaurants they choose the crowded one, because the number of restaurant's
customers can imply the perception of better food quality for them.
These phenomena produce conformity between customers and consequently one of mul-
tiple oered services may absorb most of the load resulting in congestion. In many cases,
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congestion can reduce the marginal revenue of each independent server. This work consid-
ers how dierentiating services can alleviate such negative eect. For example, an online
game company oers a variety of dierentiated services ,e.g., dierent card game. When
there are more players at a server, fewer hands can be played resulting in lower revenue.
This state of aairs occurs frequently even with ample capacity because players often
prefer to play in larger groups. The managerial challenge is to determine which games
should be opened to maximize the revenue. Is it more protable to open more of the
same and highest margin games with the highest rate of revenue or dierent games with a
dierent rate of revenue? Oering similar services may increase the probability of suering
congestion while oering dissimilar services may do a better job at segmenting the customer
base but will require introducing less protable services. This problem will appear when
customers are charged à la carte and select from a menu of oered services. These problems
are particularly prevalent in entertainment contexts, such as casino gaming and multiplayer
video games.
This study addresses the following questions:
1. When can service dierentiation improve system revenues?
2. If the service provider can dierentiate (partition) customers, what is the optimal
level of dierentiation?
We consider rst a simple model where idiosyncratic customer preferences are uniformly
distributed on the [0,1] interval and the provider oers up to two dierentiated services.
We then consider more general settings including allowing arbitrary customer distributions,
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increasing the number of possible dierentiated services and associating provider revenue
with the dierentiation attribute. The model was initially motivated by a problem in
the casino gaming industry but extends to many other types of service providers where
customers have similar attributes, such as online video games and other entertainment
settings.
1.2 Concepts
The main concept that this thesis tackles is externality. In the context of economics,
externality refers to the manner in which the cost or utility function is inuenced not only
by the individual player's action, but also by the actions of players outside the individual
[10]. The focus of this study is the eect of externality among customers, which means that
a customer's optimal strategy is ultimately dependent on the whole demand. Externality
can either reinforce or weaken the utility of customers.
Using the game theory perspective to model the system with externalities is an accept-
able technique among the researchers [3, 13]. This approach can help us to dene stable
solutions by adopting the Nash equilibrium to our problem. In addition, the concept of
externality leads us to employ the complementarity optimization model. The complemen-
tarity optimization model appears when many optimization problems share a variable.
Without the presence of externality, each customer solves an independent optimization
model to nd the best solution; however, in our case we need to solve all customers' op-
timization problems together. Therefore it is necessary to employ the complementarity
optimization model.
3
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
We complete next chapter by reviewing the previous works and outlining the signicance
of the current study. In the next chapter, we build the initial 2-server model which forms
the foundation of the extended model. We introduce most of the necessary concepts and
lemmas based on this model, and then we expand them as needed. Also, we oer a
simple computational methodology to nd the exact solution for the 2-server model in an
expeditious time.
In Chapter 4, we establish a general structure of the problem to capture a more exten-
sive and comprehensive characteristics of the problem, followed by a return to the initial
problem to investigate this ndings on it. This generalization is mainly based on two of
previous assumptions: a. the maximum number of servers which the service provider can
open, and b. the distribution of customers. For both cases, we extend the notions of
feasibility and stability, and then we establish a mathematical optimization model to nd
the optimal solution with presence of these constraints. At the end of the chapter, we
introduce an applicable model for an online game service that oers dierent game types
with dierent settings.
In the last chapter, we review the eect of conformity and dierentiation on the solution
space and the optimal solution in particular. Moreover, we compare the current policy of
service provider with the optimal dierentiation policy to determine their advantages and





This section discusses the three essential streams of research studies that we are going to
build this thesis from. First, we survey the research studies around the concept of customer
externality, i.e., when the customer's decision is subjected to the other customers' action.
Then, we explore the ndings in the area of product dierentiation and customer segmen-
tation, and nally, we investigate the chronicle of the Revenue Management Problem.
2.2 Customer Externality
The rst serious discussions about customer externalities in economic literature emerged
in 1899 [31]. In his book "The Theory of the Leisure Class", Thorstein Veblen studied how
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consumption of a good by a set of customers can change the utility of that good for other
customers. He used the word Conspicuous consumption to capture the demand to acquire
luxury goods that is used to exhibit the consumer's wealth. He believed this consumption
in the middle class depends on the consumption of the upper class. Veblen was not the
rst to mention the eect of customer consumption on the demand, but his work became
the basis of many other studies in this area.
In 1950, Harvey Leibenstein classied the external eects on utility into three major
groups: Bandwagon eect, Snob eect and Veblen eect. Two of them, Bandwagon and
Snob eect, are the externalities caused by the customer consumption and the other, Veblen
eect, caused by price. Leibenstein referred to the Bandwagon eect as a state in which
consumption of a product by others reinforces the utility, and the Snob eect as a state in
which the increase of demand reduces the utility [19].
Rather than these two externalities, we can also count the network eect as a dierent
type of externality motivated by the customers' consumption or subscription. The network
eect describes a situation where the utility of customers increases when the number of
consumers of the same or compatible product increases. This eect is commonly used to
show the increase of utility in the product which employing them depends on the existence
of that specic technology among others. The famous example of network eect is tele-
phone, in which you gain no utility of a telephone device until somebody else owns at least
one. In this study we mainly focus on the positive externalities.
The studies about the customer externality continued in three major groups: behav-
ioral studies, economic theory and market welfare [19]. The rst group tried to model
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and examine the eect of externality on individuals. In 1951, S. Asch started a series of
experiments to understand the eect of conformity on an individual's decisions. He found
a positive bond between the size of a group and the level of conformity [2]. These series
of experiments later became well known as the Asch conformity experiments or the Asch
Paradigm.
Asch demonstrated the existence of the positive externality, but why does conformity
change the demand? The answer to this question varies in dierent contexts. Bernheim
categorized the studies about the causes of conformity into two main groups: a. the
informational cascade, and b. the mutually reinforcing. The rst theory suggests that
customers follow the act of others because they believe that the customers ahead of them
have more information [6]. For this setting, Bernheim referred to the work of Bikhchandani
et. al. in which they stated that when the individuals observe the act of those ahead of
them, this can change their perception of the product and can cause an informational
cascade [8]. The next theory he mentioned is the mutually reinforcing externalities which
captures the positive eect of grouping on the the customers' utility [6].
Becker also conducted a study about a restaurant in Palo Alto, California that cap-
tures the business in that area without having an ex-ante technology. He believed that a
customer decision is subjected to the action of players ahead of them, because they believe
they may have more information and this can cause a snowball eect which he called the
informational cascade [4]. More recently, Grilo et. al. oered a spatial duopoly competi-
tion model to study the eect of conformity and vanity in the market. They nd out by
rise of demand when there is conformity among customers, the duopoly market can deform
to a monopoly [17].
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Aside from these practical studies, the concept of externalities in theoretical economy
has been studied for a long time, and in this area we can refer to the work of Sasaki
which studied the two-sided matching problems with externalities. He dened the concept
of stable matching and compared the Pareto optimal solutions with Nash equilibrium
solutions and also oered a strategy to nd them [24].
2.3 Product Dierentiation
The second stream of studies refers to the idea of product dierentiation which commonly
has been used in marketing literature. The modern concept of product dierentiation was
introduced by Edward Chamberlin in his book Theory of Monopolistic Competition in
1933 [12]; however, some researchers believe that the primary indications to this subject
is commenced by the work of Shaw in 1912. Shaw stated that product dierentiation can
t the needs of customers more eciently [26]. Nonetheless, most researchers accept the
fact that the modern usage of product dierentiation to adjust the demand curve is mainly
credited to Chamberlin's astonishing works. He argues that dierentiation can reduce
the elasticity of customers to the price. Afterwards, researchers conducted studies on the
dierent methods of product dierentiation. For example, P. Danaher studied the cases
of Airline and Telecommunication while there are customer heterogeneity [14]. However,
product dierentiation can be based on any perceivable attribute of product [28], but in the




The last stream of literature explores the related Revenue Management Problem studies.
The most revenue management studies, the managerial tools that a rm can control i.e,
decision variables are divided into three main categories: structural decisions, price deci-
sions, and quantity decisions [30]; however, the share of pricing is signicantly more than
the others. The practice of revenue management is based on the previously overbooking
management research studies [20]. In 1970s, after the deregulation Act of 1978 which let
the airlines to price their services, a series of novel studies began in this eld [30]. In most
of the early studies, researchers assumed that the demand for each service is independent
of other services [29]. Later on, researchers oered theoretical dynamic pricing models
which considered the demand for each product based on the oered price of the product
[16]. These studies initiate a new eld of research in revenue management with the focus
on the customers behavior.
In addition, research studies about the customer choice model, wherein customers can
choose a product from a set of products, enriches the revenue management studies. These
studies started in the 1970s, and later in 1985, Ben-Akiva and Lerman published the Dis-
crete choice analysis : theory and application to travel demand  [5]. Afterwards, Anderson
et. al. fused the idea of customer choice behavior and product dierentiation [1]. Follow-
ing this developement, researchers used this model in the area of revenue management to
model the customers' behavior in a more realistic context [29][32] .
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2.5 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the rst to study the concept of externalities
and congestion from a revenue management perspective. We oer managerial guidance in
the use of dierentiation as a tool to alleviate the negative eects of conformity. If we look
back at the literature, we will notice that the research studies about customer externalities
are mostly looking at this issue from the economical point of view, and they do not oer any
solution in the instance of monopoly competition. In the area of revenue management, the
main focus is designated to the pricing strategies and the concept of strategic customers.
In this study, we tried to merge these notions together and look at them from a game






In this chapter, we initially introduce the basic concepts and denitions, then we sketch a
basic model of problem, and nally, we analyze this model to investigate: a. how conformity
aects a service provider, and b. whether service dierentiation counteracts these eects.
This model includes a parsimonious monopoly service provider with a xed demand, who
tries to maximize its revenue. We divide the general settings into two sections: The Service
Provider's Setting and the Customers' Setting.
3.1.1 Service Provider's Setting
The service provider can oer dierent services on its available servers. We dier services
based on a measurable continuous attribute, e.g., the complexity of a game, position of
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an information kiosk in a mall, or even the spicy level of a meal which is oered in a
restaurant. To establish a generic model, we map the quantity of this attribute to a 0-1
interval for all possible outcomes. With this assumption, we can measure the dierence of
two services in a normalized format. To illustrate this concept, we dene a specication
line.
Denition 1. Specication line is a limited line where each of its points represents a
particular service by addressing its specication or attribute.
This limited attribute is the only characteristic that the service provider can control
to oer dierent services. Therefore, we exploit this attribute as a decision variable of the
service provider.
We dene a set of servers S = {s1, s2, ...sm}. Size of this set shows the number of
services which the service provider can simultaneously oer. Given xi is the position of
server i on the specication line, the decision of a manager for oering the dierent services
will be shown by a decision set Xs = {x1, x2, ..., xm}. Aside the position of each server on
the specication line which indicates the service it oers, each server si has a net income
coecient pi. This variable shows the marginal revenue of server i when there is no load
on it. The value of this variable can be a function of either the service or the server itself.
The next important concept is the cost of congestion. We assume that the marginal
revenue of a server decreases as the number of customers increases. We model this inverse
relationship with a linear function. The slope of this linear function is determined by α,
the congestion penalty coecient.
Instead of oering a cost function and a revenue function, we directly address a net
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income function. This decision is made based on two assumptions: rst, we assume that
oering dierent services has a constant cost independent from the demand size, and
second, changing the service attributes has zero or negligible cost.
If we look at this problem from a game theoretic prospective, the service provider is
the rst player in the game; it also has perfect information about the number of customers
and their utility functions. Based on this data, it wants to assign a set of services to its
available servers to not only maximize the revenue but also create a stable solution which
is not fragile in the facing of small arbitrary changes.
3.1.2 Customers' Setting
In this game, there is another set of players; these rational players are the customers. As
with the servers, each subset of customers is dened by an attribute which is derived from
their ideal service they have described. This attribute is analogous to the service speci-
cation. For instance, if we determine each service by its complexity, we should determine
each subset of customers by the ideal complexity they want. For later computations, we
also normalize this attribute and map it to the specication line. We use yj to represent
the position of a subset of customers cj with an identical attribute on the specication line.
By using specication line properties, we can simply calculate the intrinsic utility of
each customer from choosing a particular service, by measuring the distance between them
on the specication line.
Denition 2. The intrinsic utility is a utility which customers gain solely from receiving
a service or consuming a product [6].
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We dene the intrinsic utility by function Γ(yj, xi). This function represents the utility
of customers in subset cj from receiving a service oered by server i. Traditionally, using
an inverse function of distance for stating the utility is common in the literature [17], and
for this chapter, we will employ a similar model; however, we try to avoid spatial function
labeling for our utility function. This labeling unnecessarily constraints our utility function
to a specic set of functions.
It should be considered that the total utility of customer is formed from two distinct parts:
the intrinsic utility, which we discussed, and conformity utility.
Denition 3. The conformity utility is the utility of customers from jointly receiving a
service.
The conformity utility has a positive relationship with the number of customers that
are using a server simultaneously. We simply assume a linear relationship between the
conformity utility and demand of server. The previous studies oered dierent ways to
formulate this utility, for instance, for the network eect there is a strong trend for using
exponential functions [27] but it is important to distinguish between the conformity exter-
nality and network eects. However, as far as we keep a positive continuous relationship
between these two variables the analogy of results will not dramatically change.
To model this linear function, we use the coecient β to capture the level of conformity.
A bigger β means that people are more interested in joining a group with more customers.
This incident may especially happen when customers have a previous tie to each other,
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e.g., they are friends. The battle of sexes1 is an example of this situation, in which the
utility of being together is big enough to eclipse the idiosyncratic preferences of players
[22]. In contrast, when β is zero, each customer simply chooses the closest open server.
As mentioned, the demand is known and xed. We capture the demand by a continuous
function over the specication line.
3.2 A 2-Server Model with Uniform Distribution of Cus-
tomers
We begin by considering a parsimonious model where the service provider can open at
most two heterogeneous servers with net income coecients of p1 and p2. We assume that
the dierence between these two values originated from the servers, not the services.
3.2.1 Revenue Function
The revenue of each particular server depends on its net income coecients, its demand,
and the congestion penalty coecient. To calculate the revenue for the server i, we employ
the formulation below:
πi = ni(pi − αni) (3.1)
1Battle of sexes is a well-known coordination game with two players. In this game each player can
choose a place for a date night. Despite each of them has a dierent preference, they gain more utility
when they share a strategy [11].
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In this formulation, ni and πi are respectively the demand and the revenue of server
i. We interpret (pi − 2αni) as the marginal revenue of server, which has a negative linear
relation with the server's demand. Based on the previous assumption, α and pi are xed
and dened; hence, the revenue will be a quadratic function of the server's demand size.
The service provider is a monopoly that can satisfy all its demand, so the aggregation
of all its servers' demand should be equal to the total demand. In the model with two
servers where the demand size is N , we can write: n1 + n2 = N. In other words, opening
two servers will partition our set of customers into two subsets and generates a partition
set.
Denition 4. A partition set, P = {c1, c2, ..., cm}, is a set that divides customers into
non-overlapping subsets; each corresponds to a server.
In this denition ci is subset of customers and ni is the size of this subset. The size
of each of these subsets species the demand of each server; therefore, the revenue of all
servers can be calculated when the partition set is given. In this chapter the partition set
has only two members: P = {c1, c2}. Since the calculation of revenue for each server is
independent, the total revenue of a service provider is calculated by a summation over all
servers' revenue:
Π = π1 + π2 (3.2)
Π = n1(p1 − αn1) + n2(p2 − αn2) (3.3)
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Owing to the perfect partition set, we can write n1 +n2 = N , then we can replace n2 with
N−n1, and calculate the maximum of Π by applying the rst order condition. The results
are:
n1 =




p2 − p1 + 2αN
4α
(3.4b)
The second order condition also assures that the converged supremum point is a maximum
in the continuous revenue function.
Lemma 1. If the dierence between two servers' net income coecient becomes greater
than 2αN , then the service provider only needs to open a server with higher net income
coecient.
Proof. To have a feasible solution, it is necessary to restrain ni between 0 and N . If we
solve this restriction for p1 and p2, we will obtain an inequality described by equation 3.5;
this restriction secures us a non-negative partition set.
|p1 − p2| < 2αN (3.5)
Equation 3.5 states that when the dierence of the net income coecients is greater
than 2αN , the congestion penalty cannot cover this income gap. Thus, even with the full
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congestion, the marginal income of one server remains higher than the other yet; in such
cases, the trivial answer is opening one server with the higher value of p. We assume this
constraint is always satised.
3.2.2 Customers' decision model
The total utility of customers will be the aggregation of the intrinsic utility and the con-
formity utility. For dening the intrinsic utility function, we limit the specication line
between zero and one. Then, we use a quadratic model to dene the intrinsic utility
function based on the distance of customer's ideal service from an oered service:
Γ(cj, si) = 1− (yj − xi)2 (3.6)
where xi and yj are respectively the position of server si and subset cj of customers. This
denition ensures the highest utility for a customer when the attribute of a server perfectly
matches with the customer's expectation or simply when yc = xi on the specication line.
The utility starts decreasing proportionally as the gap between the customer and the server
increases. This function secures a non-negative utility for the customers with the maximum
utility of one. We can alter this model by changing the possible interval of specication
line and the maximum value of utility.
The function of conformity utility is determined by a conformity coecient. This
coecient demonstrates the level of customers dependency on the other customers' decision
when they are choosing between the two servers. Based on this coecient, we build the
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conformity utility, Λ, as a function of server's demand:
Λ(si) = βni (3.7)
Finally, the total utility of a customer or a subset of customers from a server is dened
as:
U(cj, si) = 1− (yj − xi)2 + βni (3.8)
Denition 5. Indierence point (yind) is a point on the specication line where the utility
of two servers are equal for the possible customers in that position.
The indierence point is driven by calculating the crossover of utility curves for both
servers:
1− (yind − x1)2 + βn1 = 1− (yind − x2)2 + βn2 (3.9)
Given cind is an imaginary subset of customers at the indierence point; therefore, the
above formulation can be stated as:
U(cind, s1) = U(cind, s2). (3.10)
By the current denition of utility function, the indierence point is a unique point
on the specication line for a known distribution of customers, position of servers, and a
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set of net income coecients. For all known servers, this statement is always valid except
when both servers oer the exact same service, which in that case there will be innite
indierence point on the line. For now we only focus on the case where x1 6= x2.
After solving equation 3.9 for yind, there is one specic answer for the indierence point:
yind =
[(x1)
2 − (x2)2]− β(n1 − n2)
2(x1 − x2)
(3.11)
Lemma 2. In any arbitrary interval on the specication line, all customers have same
server preference if there is no indierence point in that interval.
Proof. Given two points, ya and yb on the specication line, customers at ya, and yb respec-
tively prefer server A, and B. Due to continuity of utility functions, we apply intermediate
value theorem to prove the existence of a point like yc between ya and ybwhich the possible
customers at that point receive equal utility from both servers.
Without loss of generality, assume x1 < x2. By using the Lemma 1, when yind is the








Where f(y) is the distribution of customers over the specication line. When the
distribution is uniform, the above equation can be simplied to:
n1 = N × yind and n2 = N × (1− yind) (3.13)
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There are two possible positioning arrangements for a given indierence point: it may
rest either between the two servers, or outside of them. In the both situations and under
the previous assumption, yind will be exactly n1N .
After plugging Equation 3.13 into Equation 3.11 and solve it for x1 and x2, we can nd
the position of servers with respect to the position of the indierence point. The result
will be a hyperbolic curve dened by Equation 3.14:
[(x1)
2 − (x2)2]− 2yind(x1 − x2)− βN(2yind − 1) = 0 (3.14)
If we solve equation 3.14 for yind, we will nd the position of indierence point only
by knowing the position of servers. The equation below formulate this nding, consider
that by adding absolute condition to this formulation, there is no need to keep the x1 < x2
constraint.
yind =
|x21 − x22|+ β
2(|x1 − x2|+ β)
(3.15)
Equation 3.15 is always exclusively true for all value of (x1, x2); However, when x1 = x2
it is not the only answer. When we place two servers in a same position as far as half of the
customers choose server 1 and other half choose server 2, the answer is feasible and there
is no obligation to specify a particular indierence point on the specication line. Indeed,
if we look back to Equation 3.11, we can argue that all the points in the utility line are
the indierence point when the service provider oers identical services.
In gure 3.1, each axis represents the position of one of the servers on the specication
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Figure 3.1: Position of indierence points with regard to the servers' position in utility line
line, and the contours are representing the position of indierence points based on the
quadratic utility function and a xed value for β and N . Contours are symmetrical with
respect to the line x1 = x2, which means replacing the services of two server will not change
the position of the indierence point. Also, as both servers share a homogeneous conformity
coecient, the isoprot contours keep an analogous structure as gure 3.1; however, the
symmetry reference changes from the line x1 = x2 to the center point of the utility space.
This means by swapping the position of servers, the indierence point remains the same
but the revenue will change; even though, mirroring the position of servers based on center
of specication line will not change the revenue.
When both servers are in the exact same position servers are oering homogeneous
services two possible outcome can happen: either all the customers choose one of the
servers or each exact half choose one. In the later case, there is no specic indierence
point and the decision of clients is not a function of their position in the utility line.
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3.2.3 Partition Set Feasibility
We analyzed the relation of server's position on the revenue of service provider, and how
our solutions produce the indierence points and consequently the partition sets. In this
section, we discuss how the positioning set generates the partition set, and what are the
limitations.
In Equation 3.15, as x1 and x2 are limited between 0 and 1, some limitations take place
for the possible position of the indierence point. These limitations can be translated to
restrictions on the segmentation ratio of partition set's subsets size to the demand size,
which from now we just refer to it as the segmentation ratio. For instance, when an
indierence point is limited between 0.2 and 0.8, it is not possible to form a subset of
customers with the size of less than 20 percent of whole demand size.
To nd out how these limitations work, we calculate the maximum value of indierence
point by solving the following non-linear set of equations:
max yind =
|x21 − x22|+ β
2(|x1 − x2|+ β)
(3.16a)
Xs ∈[0, 1] (3.16b)
As With, we can nd the minimum value, and repeat it for various amount of β to
investigate the adjustments of solution space with regard to the changes of the conformity
level.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the maximum and minimum of possible segmentation ratios with
respect to the value of β. The lower line shows the minimum position of the indierence
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Figure 3.2: Max and Min value of indierence point based on β (N = 5, α = 0.14)
point and the upper line likewise demonstrates the maximum position. As is shown in the
gure when the conformity level is zero, there is no segmentation limit for customers but
by intensifying of the conformity level the solution space becomes more restricted. The
growth of demand has the same eect on the feasible boundaries.
This constraint can make our optimal answer, which is derived from Equation 3.4a and
3.4b, infeasible, and generates a new optimal answer on the constraint lines. When the
optimal answer is an extreme point, any changes on conformity level aect the optimal
value.
To calculate the revenue, we need to solve a highly nonlinear optimization model. In
this chapter, owing to the small size of the problem, we use a computational model to nd
the optimal solutions. We will scrutinize this issue in the next chapter; nevertheless, we
use the output of this methodology to analyze the behavior of revenue in the several cases.
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Figure 3.3: Maximum revenue based on β (α = 0.14, P1 = 2.25, P2 = 2.1)
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the revenue of a service provider regards to the value of con-
formity level. The axes x and y respectively represent the value of β and the maximum
feasible revenue of our sample system. As it has been shown in the gure, in this case, the
growth of β does not aect the best answer at rst, where β is less than 0.4, after that
there is a continuous decrease in the maximum revenue, which shows the optimal answer is
in the feasible edge region. Note that the breakdown point depends on various parameters
and in some cases it can be at the very starting point. This gure also illustrates the
changes in revenue based on demand compared to the changes based on conformity level.
As it is seen the small changes in the demand can signicantly aect the demand compare
to the conformity level.
To study the changes of revenue with regard to demand, we solve the maximum revenue
problem for dierent sizes of the demand. As demand increases, we pass through three
phases. First, the constraint 3.5 is not active yet; therefore, the optimal answer is satised
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Figure 3.4: Maximum revenue of the service provider with regard to the size of demand
(β, α = 0.2, P1 = 2.25, P2 = 2.1)
by only one server but after a threshold the two server answer will be more benecial, and
nally due to quadratic characteristic of objective function the revenue starts decreasing.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the eect of demand size on the optimal revenue of a service
provider. The solid line shows the optimal revenue of a service provider with 2 available
servers (p1 = 2.25 and p2 = 2.1) while the dotted line depicts the revenue of another service
provider with one server (p1 = 2.25) for comparison. As it is depicted in the gure, the
optimal answer passes 3 phases. At rst, N is too small and the constraint 3.5 is active;
therefore, the service provider opens only one server. When N is big enough to pass this
constraint, the service provider opens both servers to keep the growth speed and counteract
the negative eect of conformity. The nal stage happens when the revenue reaches its
highest and congestion become so intensive that the revenue starts decreasing.
Note that we never see a breakpoint such what we had in gure 3.3 while the demand
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grows. When conformity level grows, the feasible space starts to shrink, but the objective
function does not change. However, when demand grows the optimal solution moves faster
than the feasible space boundaries.
In this chapter, we elaborately describe the outline of the model, then we used an
example to illustrate the restrictions and to investigate the eect of conformity level on the
system. We found out the dierentiation can be helpful when the level of conformity passes
a certain threshold. In next chapter, we will talk about more general problems beside the




In the previous chapter, we introduced and analyzed a model with two servers in which the
utility line is limited between 0 and 1; in addition, customers were distributed uniformly
on the utility line. To generalize the model, we start by changing these assumptions one by
one in each section. In the rst section, we change the initial interval of the specication
line and we try to study the cases when the customers are not distributed uniformly over
the specication line.
In the next section, we oer a generalized model with a nite number of available servers.
We reconsider some denitions based on this new setting and rewrite the mathematical
model for this problem. Subsequently, we investigate the complexity of the problem and
possible optimization methods to solve it. Finally, we apply this model in an empirical
study in the area of online gaming.
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4.1 Analysis of a Model With an Arbitrary Continuous
Distribution
The main extension of the model we are interested in is related to the distribution of
customers. In this section, we will assume f(y)  as the customers' distribution function
over the specication line has two properties: rst, if we take the integral of f(y) over the
specication interval limits, the result will be equal to demand size, and second, f(y) is a
continuous function.
We also extend the specication line from the [0,1] to the [0,M ] interval. To carry
through with this change, we need to adjust the intrinsic utility function to Γ(yj, xi) = M2−
(yj − xi)2; this change ensures a non-negative utility for all customers on the specication
line. Although this function behaves very similarly to the previous one, it helps us adjust
M whenever needed.
4.1.1 The indierence point and partition set relation
The function f(y) is the distribution of customers over the specication line, and F (y)
is its cumulative function. For any continuous distribution, and when x1 ≤ x2, we can
rewrite Equation 3.9 as follows:
Γ(x1, yind) + βF (yind) = Γ(x2, yind) + β(N − F (yind)) (4.1)
If we solve this equation for yind, we can nd the position of the indierence point based
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on the position of both servers.
We should be cautious about two main issues: rst, losing the symmetry of solutions
when we apply a general distribution, and second, losing the unity of the indierence
point. In the previous cases, the mirror solutions of a position set based on the middle of
the specication line would result in the same output, but now we lose this attribute as
long as f(y) is not symmetrical. Moreover, we will lose the uniqueness of the indierence
point. Therefore, based on a xed position set of the servers, we may have zero, one, two
or more indierence points, which lead us to dierent outputs for one solution.
4.1.2 Stability of a partition set with 2 servers
In the previous chapter, we found that when customers are distributed uniformly on the
specication line, there is only one indierence point while we oer two heterogeneous
services. However, this does not mean that our answer is the only possible solution. When
conformity is intense enough  either demand, conformity level, or both are high all
customers cascade toward one of the servers with a small arbitrary entropy. Therefore, in
addition to the feasibility of solutions, we should also consider the stability of each solution.
Denition 6. A partition set is stable when all of the customers at each of its subsets
exclusively prefer a unique server over the other options, and sustain this preference even
if an arbitrary subset of customers change their preference.
Before we investigate the eect of stability on our solution, we need to nd when the
solution is stable. To this end, we rst dene a special case of stability which we call
ε-stability, in which the solution is stable only when the changes are arbitrarily small and
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adjacent to the indierence point. Next, we expand this notion to the limited changes in
the neighborhood of the indierence point. Finally, we expand these limits to secure a
perfect stable solution.
Lemma 3. For any indierence point yind, its corresponding partition set is ε-stable with
regards to arbitrarily small changes in the neighborhood of yind, if and only if f(yind) <
2(|x1−x2|)
β
, where f(y) is the continuous distribution function of customers.
Proof. In this problem we have a nite distribution of customers, which generates a nite
and uncountable set of players. These players can choose their individual strategy from a
set of nite and countable strategies, i.e., for a two-server problem they can choose either
server 1 or server 2.
Given 2 subsets of customers: C+δ = {cj|cj ∈ C , yj ∈ [yind, yind + ∆y]} and C
−
δ =
{cj|cj ∈ C , yj ∈ [yind, yind−∆y]}, where C is the set of all customers, and cj is a subset of
customers who are at yj, also the ∆y is an arbitrarily small distance on the specication
line.
Without loss of generality, assume that x1 ≤ x2, and customers at C−δ and C
+
δ respec-
tively prefer server 1 and server 2.
By using Denition 6, a partition set is stable if a slight haphazard irregularity does
not aect all customers' preferences. For example, if we force a small number of customers
who initially prefer server 1 to join another server and then allow them to choose again,
they should return to server 1 if the solution is stable.
Given U(si, cj) is the utility of clients at yj for choosing si when the partition set is
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balanced 1, and U ′(si, cj) is the utility function when customers at C
+
δ choose the server
that contradicts their preference. Based on these denitions, this balanced partition set is
ε-stable if and only if both Equations 4.2a and 4.2b are satised.
U ′(C+δ , s1) < U(C
+
δ , s2) (4.2a)
U ′(C+δ , s2) < U(C
+
δ , s1) (4.2b)
If either one or both of these strict inequality conditions relax to non-strict inequalities,
the associated strong Nash Equilibrium will change to a weak Nash Equilibrium.
Given F (y) is the cumulative function of the customers' distribution, we dene ∆F (y) =
F (y + ∆y) − F (y) and ∆F (y)− = F (y + ∆y) − F (y −∆y) . Based on this denition we
can calculate the size of any set of customers:
||C+δ || = ∆F (yind)
+ (4.3a)
||C−δ || = ∆F (yind)
− (4.3b)
Now, we apply these denitions in Equations 4.3a and 4.3b to solve the inequalities
4.2a and 4.2b. By expanding Equation 4.2a and adding the equality of balance point to
both sides, we will reach the following inequalities:
β(∆F+(yind)) <2∆y(x2 − x1) (4.4a)
β(∆F−(yind)) <2∆y(x2 − x1) (4.4b)















Owing to the distribution continuity assumption, we can take a limit from the LHS of













Because the distribution function is continuous, we can also conclude that the cumulative
function is dierentiable; therefore, the left-derivative and right-derivative will be equal.









This lemma simply captures the stability of a partition set with regard to changes in the
neighboring indierence point, and we extend this lemma by using the ∆-stability notion.
Denition 7. A partition set is ∆-stable if by changing the destination server of all cus-
tomers between the indierence point (yind) and yind + ∆ or yind − ∆, the partition set
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remains stable or in other words:
∀δ ∈ [−∆,+∆], |F (yind + δ)− F (yind)| <
2δ
β
(|x2 − x1|) (4.8)
Lemma 4. When a partition set is ∆-stable, the stability of this partition set will not break
due to any arbitrary changes in the customers' preference in the yind ±∆interval.
Proof. Given C is an arbitrary subset of C+∆, where C
+
∆ is the set of all customers between
the indierence point (yind) and yind + ∆. If this subset changes its server preference, it
can make a cascade and reinforce the conformity utility of the other server such that all
customers move to that server. However, the partition set is ∆-stable, and deviating C+∆
will not change the partition set. We assume yj is the most remote point of set C from
the indierence point. If function U(cj, si) shows the utility function when we have the
partition set based on the indierence point, and UC(cj, si) shows the utility when set C
is deviating from the expected choice, we can write:
U(cj, s1) < UC(yj, s2) (4.9)
UC(cj, s2) ≤ UC+j (yj, s2) (4.10)
So it can be concluded that:
U(cj, s1) < UC+j (yj, s2) (4.11)
which contradicts the denition of ∆-stability.
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Proposition 1. A partition set is perfectly stable and the system has only a Nash equilib-
rium when partition set is ∆-stable, where ∆ = max{yind,M2 − yind}.
This proposition suggests that if we move all customers to one server, they will still
prefer to return to their original server and build the balanced partition set. In other
words, a partition is perfectly stable when the system has only one Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Stability of a 2-server Model with Uniform distri-
bution of customers
To create a better understanding of the stability concept, we investigate the eect of
stability on the problem we introduced earlier in the previous chapter. For this purpose,
we simplify the stability condition for the case in which customers are uniformly distributed
over a specication line which is limited in a 0-1 interval. Based on these assumptions the
distribution function of customers will be:
f(y) = N ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
Therefore, we can rewrite Equation 4.7 for an uniform distribution between 0 and 1 as
follows:
2(|x1 − x2|) > βN (4.12)
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Figure 4.1: Revenue contour and stability constraint
equation demonstrates the dierentiation needed to secure a stable solution, and right-
hand side demonstrates the intensity of conformity.
Proposition 2. When distribution of customers is uniform, ε-stability of a partition set
results in the perfect stability.
By using this proposition and Equation 4.12, we can illustrate the stability constraint
by separating the unstable and stable area on the solution space. Figure 4.1 includes a
set of contours which depict the isoprot curves, and two black lines which capture the
stability constraints.
The upper-left and bottomright triangles respectively capture the stable areas where
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Best Answer w/o comformity
Best Feasible Answer
Best Stable Answer
Revenue with one Server
Figure 4.2: Revenue of service provider subjected to dierent constraints
x1 ≥ x2 and x2 ≤ x1. Any solution between these two triangles is unstable, which means
that all the answers in this area have a tendency to break down. In that area, the intrinsic
utility gap between two servers is small. As a result, conformity can overcome the idiosyn-
cratic preferences of customers and create a snowball eect towards one of the servers to
seek a stable answer. Clearly, when β × N is greater than 2, the service provider cannot
arrange any stable 2-server partition set; however, when βN is small enough (e.g. in Fig-
ure 4.1), it does not invalidate any feasible solutions. Note that as β grows the stability
boundary lines move toward the corners and the stable region starts shrinking.
Figure 4.2 compares the optimal revenue of the service provider in four dierent sit-
uations. Starting from the top, the rst line shows the optimal solution derived without
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considering feasibility; the second line represents the optimal solutions that consider fea-
sibility but not stability constraint; the third line captures the best stable solution; and
nally, the last line represents the optimal solution with only one server. The rst break
point (close to 0.2) occurs when the best answer drops out of feasible region when the
feasible region shrinks by an increase of β. The second break point (close to 0.4) happens
when the best feasible answer falls into the unstable region described by Equation 4.12.
The last break point (at 1.0) occurs when the feasible stable solution space is empty. If we
set dierent values for these parameters we might not see these 4 phases clearly, but the
general trend will remain the same.
4.2.1 Mathematical Model
In the previous chapter, we mentioned even for a 2-server service provider, the mathe-
matical optimization model of the problem is nonlinear. In this section, we formulate the
generic version of the optimization model for a 2-server model with uniformly distributed




0 ≤ Xs ≤ 1 (4.13b)
2(|x2 − x1|) ≥ βN (4.13c)
The rst equation indicates our objective function, the second one takes care of dieren-
tiation constraints, and the last one secures a stable solution. This model may not be
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suciently self-explanatory. Hence, we break it down into more details, while limiting
the feasible space to half. For this purpose, we again assume that x1 ≤ x2, and yind is
the indierence point driven from Equation 3.15, or its simplied version based on our
assumption: yind =
x22−x21+β
2(x2−x1+β) . Based on these assumptions we rewrite the model as:
max
Xs
Π(Xs) = Nyind(p1 − αNyind)+N(1− yind)(p2 − αN(1− yind)) s.t. (4.14a)
0 ≤ xs ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ S (4.14b)
x1 ≤ x2 (4.14c)
2(x2 − x1) ≥ βN (4.14d)
To solve this model, we can either apply a computational model to nd an optimal
solution or apply the KarushKuhnTucker conditions to build a set of equations and
solve them by a commercial solver. First, we analyze the computational model.
To obtain the optimal solution without considering the constraints, we need to produce
the optimal partitioning which is driven from Equations 3.4a, and 3.4b, then nd the
corresponding hyperbola of server's position based on this partition set by using Equation
3.9. After passing these steps, we reach the following hyperbola:
x21 − x22 + (
4α + p2 − p1
4α
)(x2 − x1 − β) = 0 (4.15)
If we nd a set of services, X = {x1, x2}, which satises the aforementioned hyperbola
constraint, as well as the feasibility and stability constraints, that set will be the optimal
solution of the model. If there were no set of services between 0 and 1 which satises
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Algorithm 4.1 Computational model of 2-server optimization
Form the equation 4.15
Form the optimal solution set O
Form the Feasible Region F
O = O ∩ F
If O = ∅{
set x1 = 0, nd the optimal solution set O′
set x2 = 0, nd the optimal solution set O”
O = arg max(Π(O′)&Π(O”))}
Form the Stable Region S
O = O ∩ S
If O = ∅{
Set |x1 − x2| = βN/2, nd the optimal solution set O}
Return O
these conditions, we narrow down our search space to the feasibility boundaries where
either x1 = 0 or x2 = 1. To this end, rst, we assume x1 = 0, with this assumption the
initial constraint 4.14c will be redundant. However, two other constraints remain valid.
Inequalities x2 ≤ 1 and 2x2 ≥ βN are the transformed version of those constraints. If the
solution violates the constraint 4.14d, we repeat the same procedure, which leads us to
another search space on the line where 2(x2−x1) = βN . With this procedure, we can nd
the optimal position set. Consider that, when either of our constraints is activated, our
optimal solution changes from a hyperbola to a single node where the optimal hyperbola
and one of the constraints are tangent.
On the other hand, by using the KKT conditions, we can oer a more generalized
procedure to solve this problem. To this end, we rst need to write the Lagrangian form
the model:
L(X) = Π(X) + µTg(X) (4.16)
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Where L is the Lagrangian function of our optimization model, µ is the set of inequality
Lagrange multipliers, and g(X) is the set of inequality constraints, i.e., inequalities 4.14b,
4.14c, and 4.14d. For this model, we will have 6 inequality constraints 4 deriven from
Equation 4.14b, 2 from the others, and all of them must be reformed to g(X) ≤ 0. With
these assumptions, the KKT condition of the model will be:
∇XΠ(Xs) + µT∇Xg(X) = 0 (4.17a)
µTg(X) = 0 (4.17b)
µ ≥ 0 (4.17c)
g(X) ≤ 0 (4.17d)
The KKT produces 8 equality equations, 8 inequality equations, and 8 variables. This
methodology is more general compared to our previous procedure but solving a nonlinear
set of equations is not always easy; nonetheless, there are many numerical methods to help.
4.3 Analysis of a Multi-server Model
All the discussed cases before assumed that the service provider can open at most 2 servers.
In this section, we relax this assumption and let the service provider open more than 2
servers simultaneously. However, we keep the uniform distribution assumption to keep the
problem away from the unnecessary complexity of other distributions. We also borrow sev-
eral of 2-server model concepts to build the current one. The following equations illustrate
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0 ≤Xs ≤ 1 (4.18b)
2(|xi−xj|) ≥ βN ∀si, sj ∈ S (4.18c)
Note that by the growth of available servers, the solving time of this model with previous
procedure exponentially increases. Moreover, dening the objective function is not as easy
as the 2-server model. To solve this problem, we rst need to elaborate it's optimization
model.
We can formulate the mathematical optimization model of multi-server problem with
two dierent approaches. First, we can extend the 2-server model which in the set of
servers' position, X, is the only decision variable, or we can add the partition size as an
auxiliary decision variable to make the problem more clear. The former case generates a
very complex and highly non-linear objective function, and the latter method may include
more decision variables, but it generates a more aable optimization model with a quadratic
objective function. In this chapter we only focus on the second methodology.
Proposition 3. There will be no stable solution for a service provider with m active server
if m ≥M 2
βN
+ 1.
Proof. If the number of active servers is greater than 2M
βN
+ 1, there will be two adjunct
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server with distance of less than βn/2, and based on Equation 4.12 these servers cannot
create a stable solution.
From now on, we assume that m ≤ 2M
βN
+ 1 is always valid. If a service provider has
more possible servers, we only keep the top m with the highest net income coecient. This
assumption keeps the complexity of our problem limited.
We base our model on the 2-server optimization model where the revenue was function of
servers' demand. To this end, we dene the revenue of service provider equal to aggregation
of all servers' revenue. If we calculate the revenue based on demand sizes, and without









ni = N (4.20)
ni ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S (4.21)
Where N is the set of demands for all servers, and S is the set of all servers. Solving
this model gives us an optimal solution, but we cannot be sure if this solution can be
implemented regards to our dierentiation constraints, but we can be sure that the output
of this model is an upper-bound of our problem. Also, by solving this model we are
able to omit the servers with zero optimal demand, and reduce the complexity of further
calculations by reducing the number servers.
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Solving this model generates a solution in which only the demands of all servers are
specied, but to check the feasibility and the stability of solution, all possible positions of
servers that result in this demand partition should be calculated.
To avoid repeating the equations, we do not rewrite the aforementioned objective func-
tion and constraints, and in each step we add the necessary constraints to complete the
model. In the rst step, we add the feasibility constraint related to the position of servers
i.e. Equation 4.22, and calculate all possible indierence points in Equation 4.23, and at
the end we add the stability constraint i.e. Equation 4.24.
X ∈ [0,M ] (4.22)
U(yi,j, xi) = U(yi,j, xj) ∀i, j ∈ S − {i, j|i = j} (4.23)
2(|xi − xj|) ≥ βN ∀i, j ∈ S (4.24)
In the next step, we need to relate the optimal demand sizes to the active indierence
points in which the active indierence points are dened as the indierence points which
in the dominant preference of customers is dierent for each side of the indierence point.
For every pair of services, we will have an indierence point where only m− 1 of them are
active and shaping the partition set. To nd out the active indierence points, we use a




i,j∈S ri,j s.t. (4.25)






rj,i ∀i, j ∈ S (4.27)
Based on this model, we can nd the indierence points. Constraint 4.26 species the
intersections that the preference of customers change, if yi,j is active both ri,j and rj,i
can be one. The next constraint shows the direction of change, i.e., when the preference
changes from server i to server j, this constraint keeps ri,j as 1 and forces rj,i to zero. Now








Figure 4.3 shows us an example of this map, but we need to check all possibilities of
servers arrangement.
Up to now, we built an optimization problem constrained by the other optimization
problem. By solving this nonlinear model we can nd the optimal solution; however, owing
to the nonlinearity structure of problem, we could not oer an approach to nd the exact








𝑛2 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛1
Figure 4.3: Relationship between indierence points and partition set with 3 server
4.4 Empirical Study
We investigate an online game service who can oer dierent range of games on the limited
number of servers. We can dierentiate the games based on the complexity of them;
however, adding an extra service with a dierent setting causes a surplus cost to the
service provider. This surplus cost is xed and determined. The rm oers more than one
game type with dierent setting. We assume that for each game type, demands, revenues
and costs are independent; thus, we can independently optimize them.
Each game on a server has a specic net income in a predened time window, which is
usually two hours. This net income depends on the server, the number of people playing
them and the congestion penalty of the game. The player is charged for each round of the
game, and the length of each round has a positive relationship with the number of people
playing the game. Therefore, as the number of people grows the number of rounds per
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time-unite decreases, as with the net revenue of server per player. On the other hand, the
players nd a game more fun if there are more crowd of players in the game.
Because of the gap between the optimal number of players and capacity of servers, the
capacity strategy does not help the system optimally. Also, changing the capacity cannot
improve the revenue dramatically; and moreover, altering the capacity frequently is not an
option for the rm. Here, we oer the dierentiation solution to counteract this problem
and maximize their revenue. By using a time series analysis, the rm forecasts the demand
for each game based on data of the previous weeks and data of a same period of a year
ago. In this game, players team together to play against an AI (Articial Intelligence),
and the rm oers 3 level of AI's diculty for each game type. With some approximation,
we assume that the demand for these levels is uniformly distributed, and we also extend
the 3 levels of diculty to a continuous spectrum, which maps the limited diculty of the
level 1 to 0 and level 3 to 1. For each game, they open with up to 3 dierent setting,
and by opening a new server with the new server the initial income of new server is 15
percent less than the previous one. The only missing elements of the model that needs more
investigation to nd is the conformity level and the dierentiation size, by assuming a xed
value for the dierentiation size, we only need to nd the conformity level. Fortunately,
on the peak hour as all servers serve almost the same amount of player, we can prole
the preference of the customer, and later on investigate the eect of conformity on their
decision. Based on this data we can approximate the value of beta for customers, this value
varies from customer to customer sometimes, but we use the median of it. However, we
calculated all parameters for all game types individually. Therefore, we can see the eect
of dierent loads on the nal result.
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The current policy of the rm is based on oering 3 services, at 3 stages of diculty
24/7, and if demand of a game exceeds a certain threshold they start opening a new server
with the same service specication. We compared the result of their strategy, with the
optimal solution we calculate based on the dierentiation model. The detailed result of




This chapter is twofold, the rst part contains the result of a two-server model which is
implemented with the sample data. The second part is the result that is generated from an
online game service provider data, to show the applicability of model for a more complex
problem. For the 2-server model, we tried to make examples as general as possible to
illustrate the dierent phases of problem, and carry out the concept clearly.
5.1 Dierentiation Strategies for 2-server model
We tie the optimality of service dierentiation to the three important model attributes:
the conformity incentive, the total demand, and the cost of congestion. As a benchmark,
we compare the results with the revenue resulting from placing undierentiated servers.
Finally, we also assess the relationship between these elements and the optimal degree of
dierentiation which may not be implementable because of the conformity incentive.
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Figure 5.1: Optimal Dierentiation with respect to the conformity level,β, (α = 0.12, N =
2)
Based on the 2-server service provider with uniform distribution, we show how dieren-
tiation studies can counteract the possible congestion in the system caused by conformity
externalities. If we get back to the Figure 4.2, we can see four dierent phases, where
in each of them revenue exposes a dierent response to changes of conformity level. By
looking at Figure 5.1, we can see the exact same phases in this graph. This graph demon-
strates the optimal level of dierentiation for a sample example with respect to the level
of conformity. At the rst phase, as the conformity grows we can mostly counteract the
negative eects of congestion. In the next two phases we face the dierent constraints that
reduce the possible dierentiation strategies, and in the last phase we see the case that
conformity level is so intense in which dierentiation cannot help the system.
The other attribute that can increase the rate of conformity is the demand size. Figure
5.2 shows the level of dierentiation for the optimal solution, this graph passes 5 dierent
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Figure 5.2: Optimal dierentiation level with respect to the demand size (N)(α = 0.09, β =
0.2)
stages. In the rst stage, N is small enough that the optimal solution will be gained by
only one server, after some threshold the optimal solution moves to one of the boundaries
(either x1 = {0, 1} or x2 = {0, 1}). In the third stage, where N = [2, 8] here, the optimal
solution is not dierent from the model without any constraint. As the solution can be a
hyperbola, there is no specic solution; however, we kept the maximum level, the minimum
level will be the mirror of curve respect to the line x = y. At the forth stage, the optimal
solution will be tangent to the stability constraint, and at the end the conformity is so
intense that all customers cascade to one server.
On the other hand, if we compare the optimal revenue of dierentiated services with
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Figure 5.3: Maximum revenue of the service provider with regard to the size of demand
(α = 0.08, β = 0.4)
the homogeneous services, we observe that the dierentiation can only help the service
provider to enhance its revenue in a limited interval. If the demand is low, the congestion
is low enough that one server can handle all the demand, and when demand is high enough,
the limits on dierentiation lead the system to choose one server again. In the example
that Figure 5.3 illustrated the improvement is between 0-13% in total.
The last attribute of model we study is the congestion penalty coecient. The gure
5.4 clearly shows three phases of dierentiation regarding the value of α. Up to some
threshold, there is no active dierentiation policy. This situation happen when either α is
less than |p1−p2|
2N
or the 2-server optimal solution cannot be conducted in the feasible area.
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Figure 5.4: Optimal dierentiation level with respect to the congestion penalty intensity
(α)[N = 2, β = 0.2]
5.2 Dierentiation Strategies for multi-server model
In this section we compare the result of the rm's current policy, virtual capacity policy,
with the result of our current model for 168 sample time units. This data is driven from a
2-week time period, and contains a full range of demands. We have the same amount of
data and exactly the same procedure for all 5 game types. In this analysis, two patterns has
been captured for all game types, which we call them over-sized and under-sized situation.
In four games, we observed the over-sized situation. In these cases, rm stays too long
to open new servers which cause the congestion signicantly aects the revenue. This
phenomena happens when the time of games highly depends on the number of player,
which causes the higher congestion penalty.
In the gure 5.5, the continuous line shows the revenue of current policy for an over-
sized situation. As it can be seen in the graph, there is a jump right after demand passes
53
Demand Size (N)




















Figure 5.5: Dierence of current policy with the optimal policy for the game type #1
15. This jump was caused by the new opening, and this alerts us we need to open the new
server earlier.
On the other side, one game showed the opposite result; in the moment the new server
is become available, there is a small plunge in the revenue. This behavior shows us that
we are opening new servers sooner than we reach the full utilization capacity of current
servers. Figure 5.6 demonstrates this plunge around the 45 units of demand. In this case,
the congestion penalty is estimated as 0.015, while in the previous case the coecient was
0.027. This coecient solely depends on the structure of the game, and how congestion



























6.1 Conclusions and Summary
This study oered a model in which the service provider struggles with an unwanted con-
gestion caused by externalities among the customer, and oered the dierentiation as a
strategy to hedge this congestion in particular situations.
We found that the optimal server dierentiation is driven by two eects:
1. Parameters that reinforce crowding require additional dierentiation to optimally par-
tition customers.
2. Parameters that reinforce crowding shrink the space of stable customer partitions re-
quiring the provider to settle for second best solutions.
For instance, if the crowding parameter is increased, relative utility for the more
crowded server will increase, leading some customers to switch servers. The service provider
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may be able to maintain the current partitioning by increasing dierentiation but at some
point, the level of dierentiation will be maximized and this particular partitioning will no
longer be stable for any pair of server types. When the crowding parameter is large enough
a single server with maximum eciency will provide higher stable revenue than any pair
of servers. This results in the following transitions:
1. At low incentives to crowd, the rst best partitioning of customers can be implemented
with minimal dierentiation.
2. At moderate incentives to crowd, only a second best solution can be implemented and
requires high levels of dierentiation.
3. At high incentives to crowd, it is most protable to operate only the most ecient
server.
In the muti-server model, we compared the solution of limited capacity strategy with
optimal dierentiation strategy. For the online game case study, we found that when
level of conformity is not very high and dierentiation can be done without any unwanted
cascade, the dierentiation can be very benecial for the rm. Although, when the demand
gets very high or in the case that conformity level is high, for keeping the solution stable
we need to decrease the number of servers, and in this case we may reach the point that
the capacity can oer a better stable solution.
6.2 Future Research and Recommendations
We introduced a novel motive for a monopolist to dierentiate services which is of interest
to a variety of service industries where customers benet from receiving the service with
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their cohort. We tried to take a comprehensive look at this problem, but as we moved
further new questions arose. We believe the problem can be expanded in two dierent
degrees.
First, we are interested to oer a more complex model with more case studies. For
instance:
a. Investigating the behavior of model with dierent distribution of customers.
b. Investigating the case when the revenue of each server is not only aected by the
server, but also by the service it oers.
Second, as either the number of customers increases or the distribution of customers
becomes more complicated, we need better algorithms to nd the optimal level of dieren-
tiation. In this thesis, we used dierent approaches to solve the problems in a reasonable






Table A.1 shows the estimated attributes of all 5 games we investigated in the empirical
study section. All games can be roughly divided into two sections. Games 1,2, and 3
have lower demand, lower capacity and higher initial marginal net income. In the text we
referred to the games 1 and 4 as a representative of each group.
Game #1 Game #2 Game #3 Game #4 Game #5
Maximum Demand 25 25 25 80 75
Congestion Penalty(α) 0.015 0.017 0.03 0.027 0.012
Conformity Level (β) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Capacity 5 5 5 15 15
Initial net Income Coecient(p1) 2.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.4
Table A.1: Game Settings for all Game Types
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